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Data Ownership and Data Access Rights
Meaningful Tools for Promoting the European Digital Single
Market?
Florent Thouvenin and Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux*
a introduction
The digitalization and the increase in global trade significantly impact the economy
and citizens of Europe. European policymakers are well aware of these develop-
ments and wish to unlock the potential of the digital economy through the EU’s
Digital Single Market Strategy.1 One core goal of this strategy, promoted by the
European Commission since 2015, is the pursuit of a free flow of data within the EU.
Such a free flow should encourage the creation of and access to goods and services
that – in their essence – collect and process vast amounts of data.
While the free flow of data is desirable from an economic perspective, as it
maximizes the use of data by businesses throughout (and beyond) the EU, an
entirely free flow of personal data goes against individuals’ interests to exercise some
control over the collection and use of their data by third parties. Therefore, a
balance between economic and individual interests must be struck by creating a
regime that ensures both. We call this desired balance an ‘adequate free flow of
data’. The term ‘adequate’ implies that a European digital economy should achieve
more than economic welfare and simultaneously protect the interests of European
citizens and consumers, especially their fundamental rights, such as the right to
personal data protection. The balancing of interests could also benefit the digital
economy, as it would promote the European citizens’ trust and confidence in the
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1 European Commission, A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final,
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digital single market in order to enable the full exploitation of its potential. To
achieve trust and confidence, legitimate boundaries to the free flow of data must
be set.
Policymakers in the EU have debated whether the digital economy may benefit
from the introduction of data ownership2 and data access rights,3 and legal scholars
have analysed how such rights could lead to a digital economy benefitting all
stakeholders. Yet policymakers and scholars have sometimes had different under-
standings of the term ‘ownership’, most often inadvertently. First, data ownership
can be understood as a property right derived from civil law concepts of property in
real estate and chattel, or intellectual property rights. This understanding of ‘owner-
ship’ is how lawyers usually conceive the term. Second, data ownership can also be
understood more broadly as a right that grants some control over data. It is this sort of
ownership that non-lawyers typically have in mind when they advocate for the
introduction of a ‘data ownership right’, most often (and again inadvertently) having
only personal data in mind. With regard to personal data, this second understanding
aligns with the approach taken in data protection law, namely in the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),4 which grants data subjects some control over
their personal data. In contrast to data ownership, data access rights serve a different
purpose – to empower individuals and businesses to obtain access to data that is of
specific interest to them. Individuals have a legitimate interest in having access to
personal data which is processed by businesses; the same is true for non-personal
data that individuals have stored with a third party, such as a cloud provider. For
businesses, access to data may be of key importance when offering innovative goods
and services in the digital economy, as the use of specific data may be necessary to
enter a new market or to remain competitive in an existing one.
In this chapter, we refrain from recapitulating the thorough academic debate on
data ownership and data access rights.5 Instead – and considering this book’s broader
perspective of big data and global trade – we look at the topic from a different angle
and ask whether and how the concepts of data ownership and data access rights may
2 See European Parliament, Resolution of 10 March 2016 on ‘Towards a Thriving Data-Driven
Economy’ (2015/2612(RSP)), OJ C [2018] 50/50; European Commission, Towards a Common
European Data Space, COM(2018) 232 final, 25 April 2018.
3 See European Parliament, note 2; European Commission, note 2; OECD, Data Driven
Innovation – Big Data for Growth and Well-Being (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2015), at 186–197.
4 Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation, GDPR), OJ L [2016] 119/1 [hereinafter: GDPR].
5 For an overview, see R.H.Weber and F. Thouvenin, ‘DateneigentumundDatenzugangsrechte –
Bausteine der Informationsgesellschaft?’, Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht 137 (2018), 43–74;
J. Drexl et al., ‘Data Ownership and Access to Data’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and
Competition Research Paper No 10 (2016); F. Thouvenin, R. H. Weber, and A. Früh, ‘Data
Ownership: Taking Stock and Mapping the Issues’, in M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (eds),
Frontiers in Data Science (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2018), at 111–145.
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serve the goal of establishing an adequate free flow of data in the digital single
market.
In the pursuit of the chapter’s objective, we first map the policy goals contained
within the EU’s Digital Single Market Strategy. Upon this basis, we analyse how data
ownership – understood as a property right – may serve the implementation of this
strategy. Based on the insight that introducing property rights in data is unlikely to help
implementing an adequate free flow of data, we examine in the following section of the
chapter whether ownership as control over personal data is a viable alternative to the
property rights approach. As a final step, we examine if, and under what circumstances,
access rights to data already exist, or should be introduced, to allow individuals and
businesses to use both personal and non-personal data. The last part concludes and
explores paths towards strengthening data access rights, for instance, through the
introduction of a compulsory licences regime.
b the digital single market strategy: basic features
and objectives
In a nutshell, the goal of the EU Digital Market Strategy is to ensure that individuals
and businesses have access to online services and products and that the require-
ments of fair competition, consumer and data protection as well as copyright are
being fulfilled. In addition, no geo-blocking should occur within the Union.6 In line
with the general objective of fostering the internal market, the Digital Single Market
Strategy aims to ‘tear down the regulatory walls and move from 28 national markets
to a single one’,7 while maintaining confidence in the digital economy. In order to
promote the availability of good quality and interoperable datasets, EU policymakers
seek to abolish inappropriate restrictions to the free flow of data across member
states. Additionally, the European Commission wants to facilitate the value gener-
ation from datasets by training their citizens in the respective fields, by cooperating
with industry and universities to determine the adequate skills required for the
labour market and by promoting access to and transfer of knowledge amongst the
private and the public sector.8
These statements show that the free flow of data is a key policy goal to enable the
EU to compete in the global digital economy. But limitations are necessary to create
a balanced approach that takes into account the needs of businesses and individuals
6 See European Commission, note 1; European Commission, Shaping the Digital Single Market,
available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market.
7 European Commission, ‘Tapping the Full Potential of the Data Economy for All Europeans’,
The Commission’s Contribution to the Leaders’ Agenda, May 2018, available at https://ec.
europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/digital-single-market-all-europeans_en.pdf.
8 European Commission, Towards a Thriving Data-Driven Economy, COM(2014) 442 final,
2 July 2014, at 5–6; see also European Commission, note 1, COM(2020).
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alike. Some of the latter fear an ever-increasing collection and unrestricted process-
ing of their personal data. In light of the power and information asymmetries
between data processing entities and individuals, this fear is understandable and
well-founded, as individuals are left with little or no control over how their personal
data is being processed.9 Thus, an important distinction needs to be made between
the free flow of personal and non-personal data.
While some individuals fear a lack of control over their personal data, they hardly
care about the collection and use of non-personal data. Accordingly, Europeans seem
to be quite comfortable with the free flow of non-personal data.10 In contrast, when it
comes to personal data, an arguably central foundation of the digital single market is
the establishment of a ‘strong, consistent and comprehensive data protection frame-
work for the EU’.11 For users to have sufficient trust and confidence in the free flow of
personal data, rules governing this flow must be adopted, and the European
Commission sees the GDPR as the critical building block to do so. According to
the commission, the GDPR is the central piece of legislation for the development of
‘innovative and sustainable data goods and services’,12 and ‘the foundation for the free
flow of personal data in the EU’, as it ‘bans prohibitions and restrictions to the free
movement of personal data for reasons connected with the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data’.13 Even if restrictions to the
free flow can be justified by other reasons (e.g. under taxation and accounting laws),
the GDPR is seen as an important step to abolish data localisation restrictions – i.e.,
rules mandating local storage or processing activities. In fact, as data localization
requirements of member states are a major obstacle to the free flow of data,14 the
abolishment of such restrictions is key to promote a flourishing European data
economy.15
9 See European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 431: Data Protection, dataset available at
https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2075_83_1_431_ENG.
10 Regulation 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on
a Framework for the Free Flow of Non-personal Data in the European Union, OJ L [2018] 303/
59, at paras. 59–68.
11 European Commission, note 8, at 11.
12 Ibid.
13 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data
and Emerging Issues of the European Data Economy, Accompanying the Document
Communication Building a European Data Economy, COM(2017) 9 final, SWD(2017) 2
final, 10 January 2017, at 10.
14 M. Burri and R. Schär, ‘The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework: Outlining Key
Changes and Assessing Their Fitness for a Data-Driven Economy’, Journal of Information
Policy 6 (2016), 479–511, at 500; M. Bauer, M. Ferracane, and E. van der Marel, ‘Tracing the
Economic Impact of Regulations on the Free Flow of Data and Data Localization’, CIGI
Paper No 30 (2016); N. Cory, ‘Cross-Border Data Flows: Where Are the Barriers, and What Do
They Cost’, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 1 May 2017.
15 European Commission, note 13, at 10; see also European Commission, Building a European
Data Economy, COM(2017) 9 final, 10 January 2017, at 4–5.
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Yet, while the GDPR certainly fosters a free flow of personal data within the EU
by establishing a (relatively16) uniform regime in all EU member states, it also
imposes substantial restrictions on the processing of personal data and thereby limits
the free development and deployment of digital goods and services. While innov-
ation remains possible, the GDPR has at least raised its costs, sometimes to a level
making the deployment of innovative digital goods and services economically
unfeasible.17 These restrictions, however, are taken into account with the aim of
protecting European citizens from the risks associated with the processing of their
personal data. The tension between the free movement of personal data within the
EU and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals is
prominently highlighted in Article 1 GDPR, which addresses both goals in a
separate paragraph. Interestingly, the European legislator is quite clear on the
priority of the two objectives by stating that ‘[t]he free movement of personal data
within the Union shall neither be restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected
with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data’
(Article 1(3) GDPR). While it is doubtful whether this priority of objectives is
actually put into action by the provisions of the GDPR, this statement supports
our perspective that any (potential) regulation on personal and non-personal data
should be analysed with regards to its ability to ensure an adequate free flow of data.
c data ownership
I Ownership as a Property Right
1 State of Research
The literature on data ownership as a property right is divided: While some authors
argue that the current regulatory system is inadequate to protect individuals in the
digital economy, others consider it adequate (or adequate enough) and therefore do
not encourage the establishment of property rights in data. A first group of authors
highlights the potential threats of big data and global trade for the protection of the
16 Many flexibility clauses exist within the GDPR that allow member states to ‘introduce national
provisions to further specify the application of the rules’ of the GDPR, introduce ‘sector-
specific laws in areas that need more specific provisions’, or ‘specify rules, including for the
processing of special categories of data’. See Recital 10 GDPR.
17 Chivot and Castro criticize the negative impact of the GDPR on innovation. See E. Chivot
and D. Castro, ‘The EU Needs to Reform the GDPR to Remain Competitive in the
Algorithmic Economy’, Center for Data Innovation, 13 May 2019; N. Wallace and D. Castro,
‘The Impact of the New EU’s Data Protection Regulation on AI’, Center for Data Innovation,
27March 2018; see also J. Drexl, ‘Legal Challenges of the Changing Role of Personal and Non-
personal Data in the Data Economy’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Research Paper No 23 (2018), at 11–12; for a different opinion, see R. Bastin and G. Wantz, ‘The
General Data Protection Regulation: Cross-Industry Innovation’, Deloitte Inside Magazine 2
(2015).
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fundamental rights and freedoms of European citizens. Data ownership, they argue,
could help cushion some of the adverse effects of the digital economy.18 The idea
behind their string of reasoning is that, by assigning data to the person to whom it
refers, the individual data ‘owners’ are put in a better negotiating position towards
companies and thus a fairer distribution of the value created by the data processing
can be ensured.19 One strong proponent of a data ownership right even argues that
such a right would empower individuals to combat the ‘totalitarian digital appropri-
ation strategies’ of big tech companies.20 Yet even proponents of data ownership as a
property right acknowledge that the practical implementation of such a right
remains unclear.21 In fact, so far, only abstract calls for data ownership frameworks
have been proposed.22
A second group of authors starts from the assumption that data is a public good.23
This means that the use of data is non-rivalrous, as data can be used by an unlimited
number of individuals simultaneously, and the use of one individual does not
18 M. Amstutz, ‘Dateneigentum: Funktion und Form’, Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 218
(2018), 439–551, at 489 et seqq.; see also F. Cheneval, ‘Property Rights of Personal Data and
the Financing of Pensions’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
(2018), 1–23; I. Landreau et al., 'My Data Are Mine: Why We Should Have Ownership Rights
on Our Data’ (Paris: GenerationLibre, 2018), at 18 et seqq.; N. Purtova, ‘The Illusion of
Personal Data as No One’s Property’, Law, Innovation, and Technology 7 (2015), 83–111, at
86 et seqq.; E. Tjong Tjin Tai, ‘Data Ownership and Consumer Protection’, Journal of
European Consumer and Market Law 7 (2018), 136–140, at 136 et seqq.
19 M. Amstutz, ‘Dateneigentum: Eckstein der kommenden Digitalordnung’, Neue Zürcher
Zeitung, 5 September 2018; see also H.-J. Naumer, ‘Dateneigentum statt Datenkapitalismus’,
in Stiftung Datenschutz (ed), Dateneigentum und Datenhandel (Leipzig: Erich Schmidt
Verlag, 2019), 233–239, at 234–236; H. Zech, ‘Information as Property’, Journal of Intellectual
Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 6 (2015), 192–197, at 197.
20 Amstutz, note 19 (authors’ own translation from German).
21 Ibid.; also V. Janeček, ‘Ownership of Personal Data in the Internet of Things’, Computer Law
and Security Review 34 (2018), 1039–1052, at 1052.
22 See, e.g., proposal by the Federal Minister of Transport and Digital Infrastructure of Germany,
Alexander Dobrindt, who called for a ‘Data Law’, which includes five basic principles: (i)
defining data as a material commodity; (ii) which belongs to a particular person; (iii) providing
transparent information about data processing; (iv) ensuring that public data is open data, and
(v) enabling individuals to have payment options instead of sharing personal data. See
Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur, Strategiepapier Digitale
Souveränität: Wir brauchen ein Datenschutzgesetz in Deutschland!, available at www.bmvi
.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/DG/datengesetz.html. For an overview of different ownership
framework proposals, see also J. Ritter and A. Mayer, ‘Regulating Data as Property: A New
Construct for Moving Forward’, Duke Law and Technology Review 16 (2018), 220–277. For
other proposals, see Landreau et al., note 18, at 76 et seqq.; also Cheneval, note 18, at 16; K.-H.
Fezer, Repräsentatives Dateneigentum – Ein zivilgesellschaftliches Bürgerrecht, (Berlin: Konrad
Adenauer Stiftung, 2018).
23 T. Heymann, ‘Rechte an Daten: Warum Daten keiner eigentumrechtlichen Logik folgen’,
Computer Recht (2016), 650–657, at 652–653; W. Kerber, ‘A New (Intellectual) Property Right
for Non-personal Data? An Economic Analysis’, GRUR Inernational (2016), 989–998, at
992–993; F. Thouvenin, ‘Wem gehören meine Daten? Zu Sinn und Nutzen einer
Erweiterung des Eigentumsbegriffs’, Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 113 (2017), 21–32, at 24;
H. Zech, ‘Daten als Wirtschaftsgut – Überlegungen zu einem “Recht des Datenerzeugers”’,
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interfere with the use of others. Against this background, introducing data ownership
needs a convincing justification as such a property right would allow data owners to
exclude others from using their data. According to these authors, property rights in
public goods should only be granted in case of market failure, i.e. if data was not
produced or used to a socially desirable degree.24 However, in the age of big data
one can hardly argue that a market failure with respect to the collection, creation,
and processing of data exists. To the contrary, the exponential rise of the quantity
and quality of data and its ubiquitous processing indicates that companies have
enough incentives for collecting, processing, and trading data.25 Even if incentives
for the collection, processing, and trading of data exist, these activities might not
lead to socially desirable outcomes. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether these
outcomes amount to an actual market failure and even more doubtful that such
failure could be remedied by the introduction of propert rights in data.
A third group of authors excludes the introduction of data ownership rights from a
fundamental rights perspective. They argue that the fundamental right to the
protection of personal data safeguards the personality of data subjects, not their
property.26 Accordingly, a data subject cannot be ‘regarded only or mainly as the
owner of the data concerning him or her’,27 as such ownership would allow data
subjects to trade their property rights away and thereby waive the guarantees of their
fundamental rights.28 From this perspective, granting property rights in personal data
is impossible, as individuals are not free to waive or completely alienate the rights in
their personal data. According to these authors, only some rights in their data could
be transferred from data subjects to third parties, but not all of them.29 For instance,
a waiver of all data protection guarantees would not be permissible, but a numerus
clausus of clearly defined ‘leases’ of personal data for specific purposes could be set
in place.30
Computer Recht 31 (2015), 137–146, at 139; L. Determann, ‘No One Owns Data’, Hastings Law
Review 70 (2018), 1–44, at 41.
24 Drexl et al., note 5, at 2–3; W. Kerber, ‘Governance of Data: Exclusive Property vs. Access’,
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 47 (2016), 759–762, at 760;
Weber and Thouvenin, note 5, at 52–53.
25 Drexl et al., note 5, at 2–3; J. Drexl, ‘Designing Competitive Markets for Industrial Data –
Between Propertisation and Access’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition
Reserach Paper No 13 (2016), at 30–31; F. Faust, ‘Ausschliesslichkeitsrecht an Daten?’, in
Stiftung Datenschutz (ed), Dateneigentum und Datenhandel (Leipzig: Erich Schmidt
Verlag, 2019), 85–100, at 99; Kerber, note 23, at 992–993; Weber and Thouvenin, note 5, at
52–53.
26 S. Rodotà, ‘Data Protection as a Fundamental Right’, in S. Gutwirth et al. (eds), Reinventing
Data Protection? (Berlin: Springer, 2009), 77–82, at 81; see also N. Purtova, ‘Do Property Rights
in Personal Data Make Sense after the Big Data Turn?’, Tilburg Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper No 21 (2017), at 8–9.
27 Rodotà, note 26, at 81.
28 Purtova, note 26, at 8; OECD, note 3, at 196.
29 Purtova, note 26, at 8.
30 Ibid.
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With regard to the question whether the introduction of data ownership as a
property right would foster an adequate free flow of data in the digital single market,
other aspects are of crucial importance, namely the impact of such property rights
on transaction costs and (as a result) on the use of data and the consequences for
data subjects. We look in turn at these implications.
2 Analysis
a transaction costs The introduction of property rights in data would lead to a
situation in which every transfer and use of data would have to be subject to a prior
agreement with the owner of the data. First of all, the owner of the data to be used
would have to be identified. Second, the potential user would have to negotiate with
the owner and agree on whether and under what conditions the data can be used.
Both the identification of the owner and the negotiation would lead to considerable
transaction costs.31
Identifying the data owner might sometimes be straightforward but will more
often be rather complicated. The former would be true for non-personal data which
is controlled by a single entity, most often a business. The latter would apply to
personal data. If one assumes that property rights in personal data would vest in data
subjects, the use of large datasets containing data about a large number of individ-
uals would quickly become very burdensome, as every data subject would have to be
identified and contacted in order to negotiate the conditions for the use of their data.
Although there are important differences between the transaction costs associated
with the use of personal and non-personal data, the introduction of data ownership
as a property right would increase transaction costs in all cases and thus hurt the free
flow of data within the digital single market. With regard to personal data, one might
argue that these transaction costs must be incurred to protect the interests of data
subjects in having control over the use of their personal data, thus moving from a
fully free flow to a somewhat restricted and more adequate free flow of personal data.
Increasing transaction costs for using and trading non-personal data by introducing
data ownership rights and thereby restricting the free flow of data cannot be
justified.32
Some scholars have argued that property rights in data could (in theory) increase
legal certainty and reduce transaction costs, as contract negotiations could start from
a clear determination as to who owns what data.33 However, an analysis of potential
31 Weber and Thouvenin, note 5, at 53–54; Drexl, note 25, at 35.
32 For an economic analysis of the introduction of a new property right on non-personal data, see
Kerber, note 23, at 989; also Drexl et al., note 5, at 2 et seqq.
33 See J. C. Sahl, ‘Gesetz oder kein Gesetz, das ist hier die Frage – Zur Notwendigkeit
gesetzlicher Regulierung in der Datenökonomie’, Privacy in Germany 4 (2016), 146–151, at
149; Kerber, note 23, at 994–995.
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criteria for allocating property rights in data shows that it is far from obvious which
criteria should be applied to determine ownership, especially with regard to non-
personal data.34 While it seems intuitive that data subjects should be the owner of
personal data relating to them, it is less clear if businesses collecting such data
should likewise have some ownership over the data accumulated in their systems.
Besides, personal data quite often relates to more than one individual; for instance, a
picture of a group of people or the genetic data of one person which always of data
about that person’s parents, grandparents, siblings, infants, etc. Concerning the
difficulties of identifying and applying a suitable criterion for allocating property
rights in data, introducing data ownership rights would rather raise than reduce
transaction costs and limit the free flow of data in the digital single market.
b consequences for data subjects The introduction of property rights in
personal data would most probably have negative consequences for data subjects.
Even if data controllers most often process personal data based on legitimate
interests (Article 6(1)(b), (c) and (f ) GDPR),35 another important foundation for
the lawfulness of processing is the data subjects’ consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). If
the processing is based on consent, data subjects can – at least in theory – decide
whether businesses may use their personal data by accepting their terms and
conditions and/or their privacy policies. In doing so, they ‘trade’ their personal data
in exchange for ‘free’ goods and services. However, under the current data protec-
tion regime, consent can be withdrawn by data subjects at any time (Article 7(3)
GDPR), thereby enabling them to prohibit the future processing of their personal
data, if they reconsider their previous decision.
Granting property rights in personal data would mean that these property rights
could be transferred to third parties.36 Given this possibility, we have to expect that
businesses would request that users of their services transfer those property rights to
them – just as they currently request users to allow for an all-encompassing use of
their data through consent. As opposed to the situation today, however, businesses
that acquire their users’ property rights in their personal data would be able to
exclude these users from using their personal data themselves and from exercising
the limited amount of control they have today. As a result, introducing property
rights in personal data would substantially weaken the position of data subjects –
which is the contrary of what people advocating for such rights want to achieve.
While the option to transfer ownership rights in personal data might have a positive
impact on the free flow of such data, the interests of data subjects in being able to
exercise some control over the processing of their personal data would be neglected.
34 Thouvenin et al., note 5, at 116–117; Drexl, note 25, at 38 et seqq.
35 F. Thouvenin, ‘Datenschutz auf der Intensivstation: Befund, Diagnose und Therapie’, digma
(2019), 206–213.
36 Thouvenin, note 23, at 26.
324 Florent Thouvenin & Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.020
05 Aug 2021 at 08:07:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich  (Bill To for 21002 Zurich Uni), on
As a consequence, the introduction of property rights in personal data would
compromise the goal of establishing an adequate free flow of data.
3 Interim Conclusion
The analysis shows that introducing data ownership as a property right does not
promote the goals of the Digital Single Market Strategy. For non-personal data,
granting property rights would raise transaction costs and thereby deter or at least
encumber its free flow. Accordingly, legislators should not introduce any property
right in such data. Moreover, there are no reasons why the free flow of non-personal
data should be restricted by any other legal means. On the contrary, the full
potential of non-personal data can be achieved if that data is shared amongst
businesses, for instance, through the granting of access rights, as discussed later.
While property rights in personal data would also increase transaction costs, these
costs could be justified with regard to the goal of protecting the interests of data
subjects in having some control over the use of their personal data. However, the
granting of property rights in personal data would lead to a different and quite severe
problem: Since property rights in personal data could be transferred to any third
party, businesses would most likely make sure that their users transfer these property
rights when using their services. Consequently, data subjects would not only lose
control over their personal data but businesses, as the owners of said data, could even
forbid them to further use their personal data altogether. Such a scenario would
undermine the policy goal of establishing an adequate free flow of personal data
within the EU.
II Ownership as Control
1 Preliminary Remarks
The concept of ‘ownership as control’ is generally accepted and well-established for
personal data and is usually called ‘informational self-determination’ or ‘informa-
tional autonomy’.37 These notions refer to the individual’s right to determine which
information about them is disclosed to others and for what purposes such infor-
mation will be used.38 Data protection laws are generally based on these concepts.
37 See Recital 7 GDPR; also Purtova, note 26, at 6 et seqq.; H. U. Vrabec, ‘Uncontrollable: Data
Subject Rights and the Data-driven Economy’, PhD thesis, University of Leiden (2019), at
105 et seqq. Note that the principle of ‘informational self-determination’ has been criticized in
the literature. See H. P. Bull, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung – Vision oder Illusion?
(Tübigen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011); Thouvenin, note 35; W. Veil, ‘The GDPR: The Emperor’s
New Clothes – On the Structural Shortcomings of Both the Old and the New Data Protection
Law’, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 10 (2018), 686–696.
38 German Constitutional Court (census decision) in 1983 (BVerfGE 65,1).
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The GDPR is even quite explicit about this underlying rationale by stating that
‘natural persons should have control of their own personal data’ (Recital 7). The
concept of control is most clearly expressed in the condition of consent for the
lawfulness of data processing (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR) and in the individual rights of
the data subjects (Articles 12 et seqq. GDPR). In the following sections, these
concepts are analysed further to assess whether ownership as control is a meaningful
approach to establish an adequate free flow of personal data.
2 Implementation
a consent At the stage of collection, consent and the right to information are the
fundamental principles within the GDPR for granting control. In order to be
compliant with the GDPR, consent must represent a ‘freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous indication’ by the data subjects by which they state or
clearly affirm their agreement with the processing of personal data relating to them
(Article 4(11) GDPR). It is key that the data subjects have a real choice to agree or
disagree to the data collection. Such a choice is challenged in cases of power
imbalances or if consent is the condition for the performance of a contract or for
the provision of a service (Article 7(4) GDPR).39 Similarly, any form of deception,
intimidation, or significant negative consequences for the data subjects if they do
not consent or later withdraw consent will fail to fulfil the requirement of a freely
given consent.40
Consent is given on an informed basis if the data subjects are able to understand
who processes what data for which purpose(s), if they are made aware of their right
to withdraw consent, and if they obtain information about the use of their data for
automated decision-making, as well as on the risk associated with a transfer of the
data to an unsafe third country.41 More often than not, the necessary information is
provided in the controllers’ privacy policy or as a specific part of the general terms of
service. In either case, the information must be provided in an intelligible and
accessible form, using clear and plain language (Article 7(2) GDPR).
Due to the complexity of digital goods and services, being adequately informed
about the data processing is very challenging and it can be argued that due to an
overload of consent notices, data subjects no longer make active, informed choices
39 See Article 29 of Article 29Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679,
28 November 2017 [hereinafter, Working Party 29 Consent Guidelines], at 5–6; E. M. Frenzel,
‘Art. 7 DSGVO: Bedingungen für die Einwilligung’, in B. P. Paal and D. Pauly (eds),
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, 2nd edn (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2018), 107–115.
40 Ibid.
41 Working Party 29 Consent Guidelines, note 39, at 13.
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but merely agree to such notices when they are asked to do so.42 Because users often
‘blindly’ agree to notices that pop up on their screens, the ability to withdraw
consent (Article 7(3) GDPR) at any given time becomes (at least in theory43) an
important redress mechanism for such situations and extends the control of data
subjects beyond the stage of data collection to the entire data lifecycle.
b data subjects’ rights Next to consent, data subjects’ rights provide individ-
uals with control over the use of their data, which is why they are also referred to as
‘control rights’.44 These rights apply notwithstanding whether the processing is based
on consent or if another legal basis applies (see Article 6(1)(b-f ) GDPR).
Data subjects’ rights include
 the right to information (Articles 13 and 14 GDPR), which lists the
(comprehensive) information that data controllers must provide to data
subjects when collecting their data;
 the right access (Article 15 GDPR), which grants data subjects the right
to get a copy of the personal data (in a commonly used electronic format)
from the data controller and the right to obtain similar information on
the processing of their data as provided for under the right to
information;
 the right to rectification (Article 16 GDPR), which empowers data
subjects to rectify inaccurate or complete incomplete personal data;
 the right to erasure (Article 17GDPR), which allows data subjects to have
their data erased by the data controller in specific circumstances, namely
if the data subject withdrew consent or if the data is no longer necessary
for the purposes it was collected for;
 the right to restriction of processing (Article 18 GDPR) in specific
circumstances, namely if the accuracy of the data is contested or if the
data subject has objected to the processing;
 the right to data portability (Article 20 GDPR), which enables data
subjects to receive their data in a machine-readable format or to transmit
it to any third party;
 the right to object (Article 21 GDPR) to data processing which is based
on public or legitimate (private) interests on grounds relating to their
particular situation;
42 B. Schermer, B. Custers, and S. van der Hof, ‘The Crisis of Consent: How Stronger Legal
Protection May Lead to Weaker Consent in Data Protection’, Ethics and Information
Technology 16 (2014), 171–182, at 171–172.
43 See B. Custers, ‘Click Here to Consent Forever: Expiry Dates for Informed Consent’, Big Data
and Society 3 (2016), 1–6. Custers describes the practical challenges that the withdrawal of
consent faces in the data economy. He notes that users typically do not withdraw consent to
free accounts but merely stop using the service.
44 Vrabec, note 37, at 111.
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 and the right not to be subject to automated decision-making (including
profiling) when such an automated decision produces legal effects or
similarly significantly affects a data subject (Article 22 GDPR).
Boundaries to these data subjects’ rights are set within the GDPR, either within the
data subjects’ rights themselves or through Article 11 GDPR. The latter limits the
rights of the data subject when the data controller is unable to reidentify a data
subject within its datasets. While the rights to access, rectification, erasure, restric-
tion, and portability do not apply in such cases, the data subjects’ right to infor-
mation, to objection, and to not being subject of automated decision-making still
prevail (Article 11(2) GDPR).
3 Analysis
When personal data is being processed, the GDPR provides a some control to data
subjects: Consent is one of the two most important lawful bases of processing,
thereby handing the decision whether personal data is processed to the data subject.
In addition, data subjects have a well-developed set of rights that allow them to be
informed about, to exert some control and quite often also to inhibit the processing
of their data by the data controller.
However, the GDPR only provides an amount of control. Most importantly, the
lawfulness of the processing can be (and often is) based on the legitimate interests of
the controller or public interests; in these instances, the processing of personal data
is warranted without the consent and even against the will of the data subject.45
Besides, control is also limited, as many of the data subjects’ rights come with
essential restrictions. For instance, the right to erasure is only granted if one out of
a limited set of situations is given, namely if personal data is no longer necessary in
relation to the purpose for which it was collected (Article 17(1)(a) GDPR), if the data
subject withdraws consent and there is no other legal grounds for the processing
(Article 17(1)(b) GDPR), or if the data has been unlawfully processed (Article 17(1)
(d) GDPR). Another example is the right to data portability, which is limited if the
personal data is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller (Article 20(3)
GDPR).
By providing a limited amount of control to data subjects, the GDPR aims to
strike a balance between facilitating the free flow of personal data and ensuring that
45 F. Ferretti, ‘Data Protection and the Legitimate Interests of Data Controllers: Much Ado about
Nothing or Winter of Right?’, Common Market Law Review 51 (2014), 843–868, at 856. In cases
where processing is based on legitimate interests pursuant to Article 6(1)(b-f ) GDPR and the
conditions for the right to erasure (Article 17 GDPR) to restriction (Article 18 GDPR) or to
object (Article 21 GDPR) toare not met, personal data may be processed even if data subject
opposes such processing.
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data subjects can exercise control with respect to the processing of their data (Recital
7 GDPR). Thereby, the law balances conflicting interests of data subjects and data
controllers and aligns them with the ideal of an adequate free flow of personal data.
The ideal of a ‘free flow’ is achieved by establishing a (mostly) harmonized data
protection law framework within the EU, while the adequacy of the free flow is
guaranteed by enshrining the notion of ownership as (adequately limited) control
over personal data.
Compared with the property rights model, ownership as control takes a more
balanced approach. In particular, data access rights are seen as a way forward to enable
a more (adequate) free flow of personal data within the EU.46
d data access rights
I Access by Individuals
1 Access to Personal Data
Data subjects have a legitimate interest in having access to personal data others
process about them. Therefore, the GDPR provides data subjects with a right to
receive information about the purposes of the processing, the categories of personal
data being processed, as well as – if determinable – the period for which the data will
be stored (Article 15(1) GDPR). Amongst others, such access empowers individuals
to verify the lawfulness of the processing of their personal data (Recital 63 GDPR).
More important – from the perspective of the free flow of data – is the right of data
subjects to receive a copy of their data from the data controller; if such request is
made by electronic means, the controller shall provide the data in a commonly used
electronic form (Article 15(3) GDPR). Where possible, the controller should even
grant data subjects remote access to a secure system, which provides them with
direct access to their personal data (Recital 63 GDPR). The right to obtain a copy is
only restricted if such right adversely affects the rights and freedoms of others (Article
15(4) GDPR), namely if providing a copy of the data would harm trade secrets or
intellectual property rights (Recital 63 GDPR). At least theoretically, data subjects
are thus able to collect and later use all the data that others have about them.
The explicit and fully fledged right to obtain a copy of the personal data is closely
linked to the right to data portability,47 which the GDPR grants on top of the right of
access if the processing is carried out by automated means (Article 20 GDPR). The
latter allows data subjects to (re)claim the personal data they provided to the
46 See also H. Richter and R. M. Hilty, ‘Die Hydra des Dateneigentums – eine methodische
Betrachtung’, in Stiftung Datenschutz (ed), Dateneigentum und Datenhandel (Leipzig: Erich
Schmidt Verlag, 2019), 241–259, at 256; European Commission, note 2; OECD, note 3.
47 Vrabec, note 37, at 216.
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controller in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format (Article 20
(1) GDPR). Data subjects may themselves receive their personal data, transfer it, or
have it, directly transmitted to another controller, if technically feasible. However,
the scope of the right to data portability is restricted to data ‘provided’ by the data
subject and to the instances of processing based on consent or a contract.48 As a
consequence, all data inferred from the personal data or information predicted by
data controllers, will not be subject to this right.49 However, the right of access,
which is not restricted to data provided by the data subject, may empower data
subjects with a right to get a copy of this data all the same.
2 Access to Non-personal Data
Individuals might also have legitimate interests in having access to non-personal data
(e.g. text documents, spreadsheets, presentations, or other files that do not contain
personal information) that they stored with a service provider, such as a cloud
storage or a webmail provider. Such data will most often be processed on a
contractual basis. These contracts grant users access to the service providers’ servers
to upload and access their files. The applicable terms of service of cloud service
providers usually state that the users own the files and that they have a right to access
their files, while cloud providers most often reserve the right to access, store, and
scan these files (see for instance the terms of service of Dropbox or Google Drive). If
the terms of service do not explicitly provide for a user’s right of access, courts might
derive such right from the underlying contract given that granting access to one’s
data is the very nature of such contracts. Accordingly, users should have a right to
access non-personal data they provided to a service provider in most cases.
If non-personal data has been stolen, e.g., by hacking a user’s device, criminal
sanctions apply. In addition to these sanctions, tort law may give users a right to
reclaim their non-personal data from the ones that stole it from them.50 Even if such
claims may be difficult to enforce in practice, the legal basis for access is given.
48 The term ‘provided’ can be interpreted restrictively, meaning that it concerns only personal
data that the data subject explicitly provided in an explicit form, or extensively, including data
that the controller collects upon consent or according to a contract (e.g. GPS, cookies,
preferences). See P. De Hert et al., ‘The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards
User-Centric Interoperability of Digital Services’, Computer Law and Security Review 34 (2018),
193–203, at 199; P. De Hert, ‘The Future of Privacy: Addressing Singularities to Identify Bright-
Line Rules That Speak to Us’, European Data Protection Law Review 4 (2016), 461–466. De
Hert argues that when dealing with fundamental rights, we should favor the interpretation that
is most beneficial for individuals. Likewise, the Working Party 29 in its Guidelines on the Right
to Data Portability argues for a broad interpretation of the term ‘provided’. See Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability, 13 December 2016
[hereinafter, Working Party 29 Data Portability Guidelines].
49 De Hert et al., note 48, at 199.
50 For a legal analysis under Swiss law, see Weber and Thouvenin, note 5, at 58–59; with
reference to M. Eckert, ‘Digitale Daten als Wirtschaftsgut: digitale Daten als Sache’,
330 Florent Thouvenin & Aurelia Tamò-Larrieux
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.020
05 Aug 2021 at 08:07:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich  (Bill To for 21002 Zurich Uni), on
3 Analysis
Although the law does not provide for a general right of access to all sorts of data,
individuals seem to be able to get access to ‘their’ data in most instances where
access can reasonably be required. At the same time, data controllers and processors
may only process their personal data in accordance with the requirements of the
GDPR. Accordingly, from the perspective of the individuals, an adequate free flow
of their data seems to be granted (at least in theory).
This is especially true when personal data is being processed as data subjects can draw
upon the various control rights established in the GDPR, as discussed earlier. Next to
the right of access, the right to data portability is seen as a powerful means to strengthen
individual control.51 In theory, this right should ensure that data subjects ‘play an active
role in the data ecosystem’52 and enable them to break up service lock-ins in the digital
economy (especially in social media). In this sense, data portability is seen as ameans to
foster competition,53 while simultaneously ensuring an adequate free flow of personal
data. However, it is more than doubtful that these goals can be achieved, since the vast
majority of data subjects have so far only reluctantly made use of their individual
rights.54 Also, the mere right to data portability will hardly suffice to overcome the
strong network effects which exist in some sectors, especially in social media plat-
forms.55 Nevertheless, the right of access and the right to data portability may prove
useful for switching providers in other sectors, such as email or cloud storage providers.
Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 112 (2016), 245–249 and U. Hess-Odoni, ‘Die Herrschaftsrechte
an Daten’, Jusletter, 17May 2004. Weber and Thouvenin (note 5, at 59) provide also references
to German literature elaborating on the right to reclaim stolen data; amongst others, see T.
Hoeren, ‘Dateneigentum – Versuch einer Anwendung von § 303a StGB im Zivilrecht’,
Multimedia und Recht 8 (2013), 486–491.
51 Recital 68 GDPR.
52 Working Party 29 Data Portability Guidelines, note 48, at 4, footnote 1.
53 Ibid., at 3–4; De Hert et al., note 48, at 195.
54 See J. Ausloos and P. Dewitte, ‘Shattering One-Way Mirrors: Data Subjects Access Rights in
Practice’, International Data Privacy Law 8 (2018), 4–28, at 5; Vrabec, note 37, at 257 et seqq.
Note that there is not much data available on the number of requests (e.g. access, restriction,
portability) made by data subjects to individual data controllers. Search engine providers only
publish the number of erasure requests received, e.g., Google publishes erasure requests made
in every country. See Google, ‘Requests to Delist Content under European Privacy Law’,
Google Transparency Report, available at https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/
overview?hl=en. Data protection authorities in the EU have noticed an increase of complaints
brought forward by individuals, see, e.g., Commission nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés (French Data Protection Authority), Presentation of the 2018 Activity Report and
2019 Issues of the French Data Protection Authority, 15 April 2019, available at www.cnil.fr/
en/presentation-2018-activity-report-and-2019-issues-french-data-protection-authority. Note that
websites such as www.datarequests.org/ have been created to facilitate obtaining access to
personal data from companies. It remains unclear whether such sites have led to an increase
of data subjects’ requests.
55 European policymakers have recently proposed legislative initiatives to tackle some of these
issues, e.g., by means of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). See
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When non-personal data that belongs to a particular individual is being processed,
data can most often be accessed based on contractual norms and sometimes based
on tort law. While these access rights are much less comprehensive than the access
rights for personal data, the latter may promote access to non-personal data for two
reasons. First, because service providers have to build their systems in a way that
allows them to extract the personal data of their users to comply with the right of
access granted in data protection law, they need to build their systems in a way that
enables them to identify and distinguish personal from non-personal data. Within
this process non-personal data that belongs to an individual, such as text documents,
can be identified and extracted as well. Second, it is often hard (or even impossible)
to distinguish personal and non-personal data, and both types of data are often
present in a single file, e.g. in a document that contains information about its author
or in an email that always contains information about recipient and sender (at least
in the metadata). Accordingly, it might be easier for service providers to provide all
the data that belongs to an individual (whether personal or non-personal) if the said
individual requests access to their personal data. It, therefore, seems that the current
legal situation should also ensure an adequate free flow of non-personal data that
belongs to an individual.
II Access by Businesses
1 Preliminary Remarks
Until today there are no general data access rights for businesses, neither with regard
to data held by other businesses nor for data held by government agencies. But, of
course, businesses can grant each other access to data on the basis of a contract. The
default for businesses, however, seems to be that data is regarded as an asset that
should not be shared with others. The general approach of collecting and analysing
data in-house and via sub-contractors, and ensuring that this data stays within
organizations and is not traded with other businesses,56 is an essential impediment
to the free flow of data and harms the overall digital economy.
As a public good, data could be used by an unlimited number of businesses simultan-
eously and the use by one business would not interfere with the use of others. Accordingly,
granting access rights to businesses would be a meaningful way to enable broader use of
data, unravel its potential, and foster competition. While this applies to all sorts of
businesses, it is especially true for start-ups and small- and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), which could benefit from the access to data for developing innovative digital
European Commission, Proposal for a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act)
Amending Directive 2003/31/EC, COM(2020) 825 final, 15 December 2020; European
Commission, Proposal on Contestable and Fair Markets in the Digital Sector (Digital
Markets Act), COM(2020) 842 final, 15 December 2020.
56 European Commission, note 13, at 15.
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goods and services.57 It is therefore not surprising that both the European Commission58
and the OECD59 are promoting the digital economy via access rights.
Even if no harmonized legal framework granting access rights for businesses exists,
some sector-specific regulations can remedy specific problems. Besides, competition
law contains generally applicable rules that may allow businesses to request access to
data in some situations. More recently, the introduction of compulsory licences has
been promoted in the literature as a new and promising way to establish access rights for
businesses.
2 Implementation
a sector-specific regulations There are three types of sector-specific regu-
lations granting access rights to data: (i) regulations granting government agencies
access to data held by businesses; (ii) regulations that provide businesses access to
data held by government agencies; and (iii) regulations providing businesses access
to data held by other businesses. The first type of access rights ensures that govern-
ment agencies have access to the data they need to perform their tasks and to take
well-informed decisions.60 Such access rights are common in many EU member
states61 but they are not the subject of this chapter, the enquiry of which is limited to
access rights of businesses. The second type of access rights is a means to make better
use of the data collected by government agencies by enhancing the reuse of such
data. The third type mainly aims at fostering competition.
The most prominent example of the second type of access rights is the EU’s
Public Sector Information Directive.62 According to this directive, this data must be
57 Drexl et al., note 5, at 8.
58 European Commission, note 2; see also Richter and Hilty, note 46, at 256.
59 OECD, note 3.
60 A. Früh, ‘Datenzugangsrechte: Rechtsrahmen für einen neuen Interessensausgleich in der
Datenwirtschaft’, sic! 10 (2018), 521–539, at 528 et seqq. with reference to European Statistical
System, ‘Access to Privately Held Data’, Position Paper, November 2017.
61 In France, for instance, the government has a right to access privately held data that are
relevant for establishing public statistics (Article 19 Loi 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une
Répulique numérique, NOR: ECFI1524250L, JORF 0235 du 8 octobre 2016, texte 1). Overall,
France has been pushing for access rights to privately held data in various sectors, such as for
scanner data of retailers, in order to improve the quality of the standard Consumer Price Index,
for mobile phone data to measure the mobility of people within local areas, or for data on
tourist accommodations offered by individuals on the Internet. Other EU member states – such
as Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – are likewise establishing regulations allowing statistical
authorities to access scanner data of large retailers and supermarkets. In Estonia, government
agencies have access to data from smart electricity meters in order to produce electricity
consumption statistics of households and businesses and accordingly plan for future electricity
needs. See European Statistical System, note 59, at 8 et seqq.
62 Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on
open data and the re-use of public sector information PE/28/2019/REV/1, OJ L 172, 26.6.2019,
p. 56–83.
Data Ownership and Data Access Rights 333
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108919234.020
05 Aug 2021 at 08:07:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich  (Bill To for 21002 Zurich Uni), on
freely available for reuse and public sector bodies are not allowed to charge more
than marginal cost for such reuse.63 However, one could argue that if private
businesses profit from data provided by the government, the general public should
in return obtain some benefits from the data that businesses generate through the
use of government data, or that at least government agencies obtain access to such
data at marginal costs.64
The third type of access rights is not very widespread, at least until today. A case in
point is the maintenance work on cars which often depends on access to data about
the car. This case is governed by Regulation 715/2007 of the EU.65 In order to foster
competition in the market for car maintenance, manufacturers of cars must provide
unrestricted and standardized access to specified information to repair workshops
through websites using a standardized format in a readily accessible and prompt
manner (Article 6 Regulation 715/2007). For doing so, the manufacturers can charge
a ‘reasonable and proportionate fee’ (Article 7 Regulation 715/2007). Another
example is the EU Directive 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market,66
which enables payment service providers to get access to data held by banks in order
to facilitate their market access.67
b competition law In addition to sector-specific regulations, competition law
contains generally applicable rules that may arguably serve as access right. In
practice, however, competition law is not a workable solution, for several reasons:68
63 European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market: EU Negotiators Agree on New Rules for
Sharing of Public Sector Data’, Press Release, 22 January 2019.
64 Früh, note 59, at 525–526. In order to prevent public sector information being locked in by
private companies that work for the government, the EU will establish safeguards that will
reinforce transparency and limit the conclusion of agreements which could lead to exclusive
reuse of public sector data by private partners. See European Commission, note 62.
65 Regulation No 715/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2007 on
Type Approval of Motor Vehicles with Respect to Emissions from Light Passenger and
Commercial Vehicles (Euro 5 and Euro 6) and on Access to Vehicle Repair and
Maintenance Information, OJ L [2007] 171/1; C. König, ‘Der Zugang zu Daten als
Schlüsselgegenständen der digitalen Wirtschaft’, in M. Hennenmann and A. Sattler (eds),
Immaterialgüter und Digitalisierung: Junge Wissenschaft zum Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz,
Urheber- und Medienrecht (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017), 89–104, at 94.
66 Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on
Payment Services in the Internal Market, Amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and
2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and Repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ
L [2015] 337/35 [hereinafter: Directive 2015/2366].
67 Article 35 Directive 2015/2366.
68 For an overview of the failures of competition law to grant access to privately held data, see J.
Drexl, Data Access and Control in the Era of Connected Devices, Study for the European
Consumer Organisation (Brussels: BEUC, 2018), at 4 and 36 et seqq.; Drexl et al., note 5, at
9–10; Früh, note 59, at 532 et seqq.; A. Früh, ‘Zum Bedarf nach Datenzugangsrechten’,
Jusletter IT Flash, 11 December 2017; B. Lundqvist, ‘Big Data, Open Data, Privacy
Regulation, Intellectual Property and Competition Law in an Internet of Things-World: The
Issue of Access’, in M. Bakhoum et al. (eds), Personal Data in Competition, Consumer
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First, with regard to access rights, competition law only comes into play in respect of
businesses with a dominant position; even if this condition is met, access can only be
requested in case of an abuse of such dominance (Article 102 TFEU). Second, the
traditional criteria for defining the relevant market are not very helpful for defining
markets in the data economy.69 Third, and most importantly, competition law
cases take a very long time to be decided, sometimes up to ten years.70 It is obvious
that businesses requesting access to data need much faster procedures to enforce
their rights. Therefore, competition law is not a meaningful way for granting
access to data.
c compulsory licences A promising way forward for ensuring access to data is
the granting of compulsory licences as known in intellectual property law. As
opposed to competition law, where courts define the conditions of granting a
licence ex post, the conditions of such compulsory licences are defined ex ante.
The difficulty here rests in establishing a system that considers the interests of all
businesses involved, the one requesting and the one granting access, especially the
latter’s interest in securing its trade secrets.71
A general right of access to data would have to be regulated in a generally
applicable body of law. A suitable and convincing approach is introducing such a
right in trade secrets law. This previously quite heterogeneous body of law has
recently been harmonised by the EU’s Trade Secrets Directive.72 The directive
contains an expansive notion of trade secrets embracing all secret information (i.e.
information not generally known or readily accessible) that has commercial value
because it is secret and is subject to reasonable steps to keep it secret.73 This
definition encompasses most data held by businesses. Accordingly, amending trade
secrets law would be a promising way to introduce general compulsory licences for
granting access to data. While such an approach would be rather broad, compulsory
licences could also be granted in sector-specific regulations, such as in telecommu-
nications or energy acts, or in a potential regulation of platforms, covering search
Protection and Intellectual Property Law: Towards a Holistic Approach? (Berlin: Springer, 2018),
191–214, at 202–203.
69 Drexl, note 67, at 36; Lundqvist, note 67, at 202–203.
70 Früh, note 59, at 535; for an illustrative example, see R. Podszun, ‘Lizenzverweigerung –
Ernstfall im Verhältnis von Kartell und Immaterialgüterrecht’, in P. Matousek, E. Müller, and
T. Thanner (eds), Jahrbuch Kartell- und Wettbewerbsrecht (Wien: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher
Verlag, 2010), 57–76.
71 Früh, note 59, at 528, 530; A. Wiebe, ‘Von Datenrechten zu Datenzugang – Ein rechtlicher
Rahmen für die europäische Datenwirtschaft’, Computer und Recht 33 (2017), 87–93, at 92.
72 Directive 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the
Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade Secrets) against Their
Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, OJ L [2016] 157/1 [hereinafter, Directive 2016/943].
73 Article 2(1) Directive 2016/943.
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engines or social media providers. In any case, access rights should not be granted
for free. Rather, any business making use of its right of access should pay a fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) compensation to the business that has
collected, stored, and curated the data.74
Even if compulsory licences are considered a meaningful way of granting access
to data, many things are still unclear. For example, one would have to define the
conditions for granting such a licence and its scope (i.e., the data which is covered),
as well as the purpose for which the data may be used if access is granted.75 Today’s
case law contains some hints to address these important questions – the need for
having access to data for entering a secondary market.76 Other conditions could
relate to single source data situations or some degree of market power of the business
that should grant access. Also, one would have to decide whether a compulsory
licence includes the right to get a copy of the data or whether such right should be
limited to using and analysing the data on the machines of the trade secret owner.
Lastly, and most importantly, even if compulsory licences are considered a suitable
mechanism for granting access rights, it remains unclear if granting such licences
is justified.
The most important argument in favour of introducing compulsory licences is
undoubtedly the fact that data is a public good, as discussed earlier. Also, the
business of most companies is not selling data to their customers but providing
services that are based on data. As a consequence, granting access to data does not
necessarily have a negative impact on the market share of the business that has to
provide access. If this should be the case, one could consider restricting access to
businesses that are not direct competitors but active in a secondary or even in an
entirely different market.
The most important argument against granting access rights is the risk of under-
mining incentives for collecting, storing, and curating data. However, for the time
being, it is hard to imagine that well-defined access rights would actually undermine
such incentives to a relevant degree.
3 Analysis
Access rights for businesses are a meaningful way to enhance the free flow of data in
the digital single market in order to foster innovation and strengthen the competing
power of European companies. While competition law is not a workable solution,
74 European Commission, note 13, at 39; Früh, note 59, at 537; Früh, note 67.
75 Früh, note 67.
76 Lundqvist, note 67, at 202–203 with reference to Joined Cases C-241/91 and C-242/91, Radio
Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission of the
European Communities [1995], ECLI:EU:C:1995:98; C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co.
OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG [2004], ECLI:EU:C:2004:257; T-201/04, Microsoft
Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities [2007], ECLI:EU:T:2007:289.
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two complementary approaches seem quite promising: First, trade secrets law could
be amended to include compulsory licences, which allow businesses to claim
access to data held by other businesses. Given the very broad scope of application
of trade secrets law, this approach would allow to establish a general right of access
to data. In order to protect the interests of businesses that have to grant access,
relatively strict conditions would have to be designed and businesses requesting
access would have to pay an appropriate licence fee. Second, sector-specific regula-
tions could grant specific access rights. In such regulations, the conditions for
claiming access could be modified and be either stricter or more lenient than in
trade secrets law and certainly more specific, also with regard to the calculation of
the licence fee. In addition, there might be situations in which access should be
granted for free or only if the businesses involved grant each other access on a
mutual basis (cross-licence). The combination of these two approaches would allow
for a comprehensive regime of access rights, ensure an appropriate balancing of
interests, and help establish an adequate free flow of data amongst businesses in the
digital single market.
For the free flow to be fully adequate the interests of the individuals represented
in the data must be taken into account as well. This is ensured by the application of
the GDPR, which regulates virtually all processing of personal data by businesses
(Article 2(1) GDPR), including the granting of access to such data. Access to
personal data can thus only be granted in accordance with the requirements of
the GDPR, namely the principles of transparency and purpose limitation (Article 5
(1)(a) and (b) GDPR), the conditions for the lawfulness of processing, namely
consent of the data subjects or legitimate interest of the data controller (Article 6
(1)(a) and (f ) GDPR), the information duties (Articles 13(1)(e) and 14GDPR), and (if
applicable) the conditions for the transfer of personal data to third countries (Articles
44 et seqq. GDPR).
If these requirements are met, one can certainly say that granting access to data
through compulsory licences is a promising way to establish an adequate free flow of
data in the digital single market. Given that many questions still need to be
answered, it is also an avenue that deserves further research.
e conclusion
In order to unlock the potential of the digital economy, the EU promotes its Digital
Single Market Strategy. A core aspect of this strategy is establishing an adequate free
flow of data within the Union. This adequate free flow balances economic interests
of businesses of an entirely free flow of all types of data and individual interests to
have some control of the collection and processing of personal data. To achieve this
balance, different regulations have been set in place, such as the Trade Secrets
Directive, the Open Data, some sector-specific regulations granting access rights,
and, above all, the GDPR.
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These regulatory attempts have been accompanied by a policy discussion on data
ownership and data access rights. As shown in this contribution, data ownership can
be understood both as a form of property and as a form of control. Both concepts are
not equally fit to achieve the goal of establishing an adequate free flow of data within
the digital single market. The introduction of data ownership as a property right for
personal and non-personal data would increase transaction costs and impede the
trading and the use of data. Such a right would thus hinder the EU’s goal of
achieving a free flow of data. Additionally, in terms of processing personal data,
ownership as a property right does not aid individuals to remain in control of their
personal data. To the contrary, such ownership rights would substantially weaken
their position, as businesses could acquire these rights and exclude the data subjects
from using their own personal data. Therefore, the concept of ownership as a
property right can be dismissed as a model to help achieve the goals of the Digital
Single Market Strategy. The concept of ownership as control has been implemented
in the GDPR for the processing of personal data and has the potential to balance
economic and individual interests. From an economic perspective, the harmoniza-
tion of rules and the prohibition of data localization restrictions enhance the free
flow of personal data. In contrast, the necessity to comply with the data protection
principles (Article 5 GDPR), the need to establish a basis for the lawfulness of all
processing of personal data (Article 6 GDPR) and the increased compliance duties
of data controllers limit the processing activities and require the establishment of
costly organizational and technical solutions to enable data subjects to make use of
their individual rights (e.g., right of access and erasure). From an individual
perspective, however, these limitations and in particular the (limited) control over
how data about them is collected, as well as the options to interfere with the
processing of said data at a later stage, are welcomed by many. It remains to be
seen, however, whether individuals will actually exercise their (limited) control and
whether the current approach of data protection law is able to strike an appropriate
balance between economic and individual interests. While some doubts remain, the
GDPR can be seen as a first step towards establishing an adequate free flow of
personal data within the digital single market.
To achieve the goal of an adequate free flow of data within the EU, individuals
and businesses should have access to the data necessary to pursue their interests. For
individuals, access to their personal data is key to ensure informational self-
determination. Such access is granted by the GDPR, in particular through the right
of access and the right to data portability. In most cases, individuals also tend to have
sufficient means to access non-personal data that belongs to them. Businesses should
have access and be able to use personal and non-personal data as seamlessly as
possible in order to develop innovative goods and services and strengthen their
competing power, both within the EU and on a global level. The goal of a fully
free flow of data, however, must be balanced against the interest of individuals in the
protection of their personal data and the interest of businesses in the protection of
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their trade secrets. Accordingly, a business’ access to personal data held by another
business must only be granted in accordance with the GDPR. If these requirements
are met or do not apply (as in the case of non-personal data), access to and use of
data should be fostered. One way forward is the introduction of additional sector-
specific access rights. Another, more all-encompassing and possibly more promising
way, is to establish a general right of access to data which is protected as a trade
secret by introducing compulsory licences in trade secrets law. Obviously, such
licences would only be granted if certain conditions are met, and if an appropriate
licence fee is paid. But the mere existence of such licences and the enforcement on
a case-by-case basis could help to open up datasets which have been sealed behind
corporate walls despite the fact that the data could be useful for others. Overall, the
introduction of compulsory licences to grant access to data would allow for the
balancing of interests of the businesses holding data with the interests of other
businesses that need access to such data to enter a market, develop innovative goods
or services, or remain competitive.
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